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Efficiency Losses of Logit-based Stochastic User Equilibria in 
Traffic Networks under ATIS 
 
Hai-Jun Huang, Tian-Liang Liu, Xiao-Lei Guo, Hai Yang 
 
Abstract In this paper we derive the upper bounds of the cost inefficiencies of logit-based 
stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) traffic flow patterns under Advanced Traveler 
Information Systems (ATIS). All drivers are divided into two groups, one equipped with 
ATIS and another without, and both of which follow the logit-based SUE principle in 
route choice. The equipped drivers have less degree of travel time variability than the 
unequipped ones. The cost inefficiency is defined as a ratio between the total cost incurred 
by players in a SUE state and the minimum-possible total cost. The effects of various 
parameters on the bound are investigated. It is found that the increasing of congestion 
degree, total demand and network complexity will make the bound go up, while the 
promotion of ATIS market penetration and information quality will reduce the bound. 
 
Keywords Stochastic user equilibrium; System optimum; Efficiency loss; ATIS market 
penetration; Network 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in transportation science on the consequences 
of selfish travel behavior. For quantifying the degradation in network performance due to 
the lack of coordination, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) introduced the notion of 
coordination ratio or price of anarchy to measure the worst-case performance of 
uncoordinated users against the optimal solution achieved by centralized control. The term 
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“price of anarchy” has been coined to characterize the degree of inefficiency which is the 
worst possible ratio between the total cost incurred by players in a Nash equilibrium 
situation and the minimum-possible total cost. The minimum-possible cost is generally 
implemented by centralized control. Roughgarden (2002) proved that the worst-case 
inefficiency due to selfish routing is independent of the network topology. Roughgarden 
and Tardos (2002, 2004) further proved that the total time of a non-toll user equilibrium 
(UE) is at most that of the system optimum (SO) with doubled demand in the same 
network. Moreover, the total time of a non-toll UE is at most 4/3 times that of the SO 
when all link travel time functions are linear. Correa et al. (2004) provided a simple 
geometric proof for the price of anarchy for the user equilibrium with fixed demand, using 
a variational inequality (VI) expression of UE conditions. They also showed that the 
addition of link capacity constraints does not change the worst ratio between the best UE 
and the SO. Chau and Sim (2003) proved that the price of anarchy result still holds for 
systems with symmetric non-separable link travel time functions. The efficiency of atomic 
splittable selfish route with polynomial cost functions was studied by Yang et al. (2008). 
Roughgarden (2005) summarized the latest developments of this research subject.  
In the context of traffic networks, the studies up to date in deriving the inefficiency 
upper bounds contain such an assumption that the selfish drivers have perfect information 
about the network’s traffic condition and know other drivers’ route choices, so the 
deterministic UE state being reached. The interpretation of the stochastic user equilibrium 
(SUE) in the literature is that it is an outcome of all users’ route choices for minimizing 
their perceived travel costs (Sheffi, 1984). The perceived travel cost is regarded as a 
random variable due to travel time uncertainty and users’ perception error of travel time. 
Following this line of thinking, Guo and Yang (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005) 
investigated the bound of the cost inefficiency of a SUE flow pattern in relation to the 
Wardropian system optimum. 
The advanced traveler information systems (ATIS) that provide travelers real-time 
information of traffic condition, are generally believed to be efficient in many aspects such 
as improving individuals’ trip planning, alleviating road congestion and enhancing 
network performance. For investigating the multiple equilibrium behaviors of different 
classes of users, various multi-class traffic models have been developed, which 
differentiate travelers who receive information versus those who don’t have information 
(Harker, 1988; Liu et al., 2007; Van Vuren and Watling, 1991; Yang, 1998). 
In this paper, we extend the works of Guo and Yang (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005) 
that dealt with single user class only, to the two-user class case in which one class is 
equipped with ATIS and another without. All drivers are divided into two classes, both of 
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which follow the SUE principle in route choices. Drivers who are equipped with ATIS are 
able to receive real-time traffic information so as to assess the routes’ attributes more 
accurately than unequipped drivers. This means equipped drivers have less degree of 
travel time variability than unequipped drivers. We derive the upper bounds of the cost 
inefficiencies caused by stochastic user equilibrium with two user classes and examine the 
effects of various parameters on the bound. These parameters are the ones reflecting the 
network’s complexity, the link cost function’s property, the ATIS quality and market 
penetration.  
 
 
2 The SO and two-user class SUE models 
 
Consider a network  ,G N A , where N  is the set of nodes and A  the set of links in 
the network. Let W  be the set of all OD (origin-destination) pairs and wR  the set of all 
possible routes connecting OD pair w W . Considering traffic congestion, we assume 
that the travel time on each link a A , is a monotonically increasing and convex function 
of the link flow av . This function is also separable, we then have  a a at t v , a A . 
 
2.1 The system optimum 
 
The Wardropian SO model that minimizes the system’s total travel time is expressed by  
   min  
v
a a a
a A
T t v v 
v v  (1) 
where v  is defined by  
 , , 0v  v v = Δf  Λf = d  f  (2) 
where  T,av a A v ,  T,wd w W d  and  T= , ,rw wf r R w W f , representing the 
vectors of link flows, OD demands and path flows, respectively;  arΔ  is the 
link/path incidence matrix, ar  {1, if link a  is on path r  and 0, otherwise}; 
 rw Λ  is the OD/path incidence matrix, rw  {1, if path wr R  and 0, otherwise}. 
Since  a at v  is monotonically increasing and convex, then  a a at v v  is convex and thus, 
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the solution to the SO problem (1)-(2) is unique. 
 
2.2 The two-user class SUE with ATIS market penetration 
 
In reality, the information available to equipped drivers could be partial or imperfect, and 
thus the travel time perceived by them, although with help from ATIS, is stochastic, but 
with less variability than that by unequipped drivers. Let w wd  and  1 w wd  be the 
demands of the equipped and unequipped drivers between OD pair w W , respectively, 
here w  ( 0 1w  ) is the ATIS market penetration between OD pair w W . Suppose 
that all random terms representing the travel time uncertainty and users’ perception error, 
are independent and identical distributed Gumbel variables with mean zero, according to 
the utility maximization theory, at equilibrium the path choices of equipped and 
unequipped drivers are the solution of the following convex minimization problem (Huang 
and Li, 2007) 
   
0
1 1min , d ln lna
w w
v
a rw rw rw rw
a A w W r R w W r R
Z t x x f f f f           f f  (3) 
subject to 
w
rw w w
r R
f d

 , w W  (4) 
 1
w
rw w w
r R
f d

  , w W  (5) 
0rwf  , wr R , w W  (6) 
0rwf  , wr R , w W  (7) 
 
w
a rw rw ar
w W r R
v f f 
 
   , a A  (8) 
where rwf  and rwf  are the path flows of equipped and unequipped drivers on path 
wr R  between OD pair w W , respectively.   and   are the parameters 
representing the travel time variations of equipped and unequipped drivers, respectively. A 
higher  -value means a smaller variation for the equipped drivers. Hence, the  -value 
can be used to represent the quality of the traffic information provided by ATIS. The 
parameter   reflects the familiarity degree to traffic conditions by unequipped drivers. 
The relation    holds, which claims that the equipped drivers have lower variations 
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on travel time than the unequipped. 
Solving the above minimization problem (3)-(8) gives the following logit-based path 
flow solution 
 
 
exp
exp
w
rw
rw w w
lw
l R
c
f d
c
 

  , wr R , w W  (9) 
    
exp
1
exp
w
rw
rw w w
lw
l R
c
f d
c
 

   , wr R , w W  (10) 
where rwc  is the actual (or measured) travel time of path wr R  between OD pair 
w W ,  rw a a ar
a A
c t v 

 . The existence and uniqueness of the path flow solution are 
guaranteed since all link travel time functions in the problem (3)-(8) are monotonically 
increasing and the feasible region is compact (Sheffi, 1984). 
 
 
3 Determination of the cost inefficiency bound 
 
Let sof  and sov  be the path flow and link flow solutions of the SO problem (1)-(2) 
respectively,  sue sue,f f  and suev  be the path flow and link flow solutions of the SUE 
problem (3)-(8) respectively. We define the following ratio 
 
 
suesue
sue mixed
mixed so so
TT
T T
   v
v
 (11) 
where    sue sue sue suemixed a a a
a A
T T t v v

 v  with  sue sue sue
w
a rw rw ar
w W r R
v f f 
 
   , a A , and 
   so so so soa a a
a A
T T t v v

 v  with so so
w
a rw ar
w W r R
v f 
 
   , a A . Clearly, suemixed 1   always 
holds since selfish routing generally does not yield an SO flow pattern (i.e., the UE and 
SUE are typically inefficient). In this study, we call the ratio suemixed  the cost inefficiency, 
or the price of anarchy, of the two-user class stochastic user equilibrium under ATIS. The 
purpose of our study is to find the upper bound of the inefficiency suemixed . For this, we 
first introduce a lemma. 
Lemma 1 If the separable link cost function,  a at v , a A , is monotonically increasing 
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with link flow, a logit-based two-user class SUE problem with fixed OD demand is 
equivalent to the following variational inequality, i.e., find  sue sue ,, f ff f  satisfying 
Eqs.(4)-(7) , such that 
   sue sue sue sue1, ln
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
c f f f 
      f f  
   sue sue sue sue1, ln 0
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
c f f f 
        f f ,   ,, f ff f  (12) 
where 0   and 0   are the travel time variability parameters of the two user 
classes respectively,    sue sue sue,rw a a ar
a A
c t v 

f f  is the travel cost of path r  between 
OD pair w , and 
    , , , 1 , 0, 0f f    f f Λf = λd  Λf = λ d f f  (13) 
Proof The problem (3)-(8) has unique path flow solution  sue sue ,, f ff f , and its 
entropy-type function ensures that the optimum is achieved at an interior point. Using 
 
w
a rw rw ar
w W r R
v f f 
 
   , a necessarily and sufficient condition for a unique optimum 
 sue sue ,, f ff f  is that 
       T Tsue sue sue sue sue sue,  + ,   0Z Z          f ff f f f f f f f ,  
  ,, f ff f  (14) 
Substituting  
      TTsue sue sue sue sue1, , 1+ ln + , ,rw rwZ f c        f f f f f   
and  
      TTsue sue sue sue sue1, , 1+ ln + , ,rw rwZ f c        f f f f f   
where    sue sue sue,rw a a ar
a A
c t v 

f f , into Eq. (14), and in view of  
   sue1 1 0
w
rw rw w w w w
w W r R w W
f f d d            
and  
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   sue1 1 (1 ) (1 ) 0
w
rw rw w w w w
w W r R w W
f f d d             
we then get the VI (12).    
According to the class composition of flows, we decompose the SO path flow 
 so so= , , Trw wf r R w W f  into so sorw w rwh f ,  so so1rw w rwh f  , wr R , w W . Clearly, 
so so so h h f  and  so so ,, f fh h . From Lemma 1, we then have 
   sue sue sue so sue1, ln
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
c f h f 
      f f  
   sue sue sue so sue1, ln 0
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
c f h f 
        f f  (15) 
This leads to 
  sue so sue so so somixed
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
T T c c h h
 
      
 suo so sue1 ln
w
rw rw rw
w W r R
f h f     sue so sue1 lnw rw rw rww W r R f h f     (16) 
where  
 sue sue sue,rw rwc c f f   
   so so so sorw rw rwc c c  f h h   
   sue sue sue sue sue suemixed
w
rw rw rw a a a
w W r R a A
T c f f t v v
  
        
   so so so so so so
w
rw rw rw a a a
w W r R a A
T c h h t v v
  
       
Note that the second term of the right-hand-side of Eq. (16) can be rewritten as  
       sue so so so sue so so
w
rw rw rw rw a a a a a
w W r R a A
c c h h t v t v v
  
       
Hence, Eq. (16) becomes 
    sue so sue so somixed a a a a a
a A
T T t v t v v

    
 suo so sue1 ln
w
rw rw rw
w W r R
f h f     sue so sue1 lnw rw rw rww W r R f h f     (17) 
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sue
av
Link Cost 
Function 
Free-flow 
Travel Time 
Travel Time 
Flow
0  
av
  suea at v  
   a at v  
0
at  
 
Fig. 1 Geometric illustration of the definition of   C  
We now consider how to determine the upper bound of the second term of the 
right-hand-side of Eq. (17). See the shaded rectangle in Fig. 1, which is 
    suea a a a at v t v v . For each link cost function  a a at t z  and nonnegative link flow 
0az  , we define the following parameter (Yang and Huang, 2005) 
       0, maxa a a a a aa a a v a a a
t z t v v
t z
t z z


  (18) 
Here, let 0 / 0 0  by convention. Since       a a a a a a a at z t v v t z v   if 0 a av z  , 
and      0a a a a at z t v v   if a av z , we then have  , 1a a at z  . So, there exists an 
upper bound for  ,a a at z  with given link cost function at  and link flow az . For a 
given class C  of link cost function (for example, a family of linear cost function or 
polynomials of a certain degree), we let 
   
, 0
max ,
a a
a a at z
t z 
 

C
C  (19) 
With this definition, letting av  be 
so
av  and az  be 
sue
av  in Eq. (18), we then have 
    sue so soa a a a a
a A
t v t v v

    sue suea a a
a A
t v v

 C   suemixedT C  (20) 
Now we turn to seek a bound for the sum of the third and forth terms of the 
right-hand-side of Eq. (16) or Eq. (17), and thereby bound the overall cost inefficiency of 
the two-user class SUE. Before doing this, we first introduce a lemma which has been 
proven in Guo and Yang (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005). 
Lemma 2 Consider the following maximization problem  
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   
1
max  , ln
n
i i i
i
F y x x

 x y  (21) 
subject to 
1
n
i
i
x d

 , 
1
n
i
i
y d

 , , 0i ix y  , 1,2, ,i n   (22) 
where 0d   is a constant. The optimal objective function value of this problem is 
maxF kd , where k  solves such an equation that  1kke n e  , with e  being the 
base of natural logarithm, or if it is defined that   xg x xe , then   1 1k g n e  . 
From Lemma 2, it follows immediately that 
 suo so sueln
w
rw rw rw w w w
r R
f h f k d

   (23) 
   sue so sueln 1
w
rw rw rw w w w
w W r R
f h f k d
 
     (24) 
where   1 1w wk g R e  , w W , and wR is the number of feasible paths between 
OD pair w W .  
Substituting Eqs. (20), (23) and (24) into Eq. (17) yields 
   sue so suemixed mixed 1 1 1w w w w w w
w W w W
T T T k d k d         C  (25) 
Let w
w W
D d

   be the total traffic demand in the network;  w w w
w W
d D k 

   be 
the equipped drivers’ average of wk , weighted by total OD demand; and 
 (1 )w w w
w W
d D k 

   be the unequipped drivers’ average of wk , weighted by total 
OD demand. Then, Eq. (25) can be rewritten as 
 sue so suemixed mixedT T T D   
      C  (26) 
Furthermore, define soc T D  as the average travel time of all network users at system 
optimum. Then, from Eq. (26), we arrive at the following bounding result. 
Theorem 1 Let C  be a family of continuous, nondecreasing latency functions. Consider 
an instance of the two-user class SUE model (3)-(8) with separable link cost functions 
drawn from C . Then, the ratio of the total travel time of the two-user class SUE flow 
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pattern to that of a system optimum is bounded from above by suemixed , i.e.,  
 
sue
sue mixed
mixed so
1 11
1
T
T c
    
                C
 (27) 
We note that the inefficiency bound given in Theorem 1 is a worst-case measure, taken 
over all possible instances. The actual ratio suemixed  in realistic instances could be 
substantially smaller. Indeed, in a traffic network, the free-flow travel time is usually not a 
negligible fraction, which is encountered in both SUE and SO flow states. Here, similar to 
Correa et al. (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005), we present a parameterized, improved 
bound on the inefficiency of SUE. 
Theorem 2 Let C  be a family of continuous, nondecreasing latency functions. Consider 
an instance of the two-user class SUE model (3)-(8) with separable link cost functions 
drawn from C , such that the free-flow link travel time      sue sue0a a at t v v  for all 
a A , for some positive constant  sue0 1 v , where   can depend on the SUE link 
flow pattern suev . Then, the ratio of the total travel time of the two-user class SUE flow to 
that of a system optimum is bounded from above by suemixed , i.e., 
    
sue
sue mixed
mixed so sue
1 11
1 1
T
T c
    
                v C
 (28) 
 
 
4 Parameters influencing the bound 
 
As shown in Eq. (28), the cost inefficiency bound of the two-user class SUE depends on 
seven parameters, namely   C ,  sue v , c ,  ,  ,   and  . We now investigate 
the properties of these parameters and examine their effects on the cost inefficiency 
bound.  
  1 C  is a dimensionless number defined exclusively by the class of link cost 
functions. The bound increases with the value of   C . Consider the special case of 
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polynomial link cost functions,    0 pa a a a at v t v  , a A , where 0at  is a constant 
representing free-flow link travel time, 0a   is a link-specific parameter and 0p   is 
a real number. Yang and Huang (2005) showed that, with the polynomial link cost 
functions,   C  has an upper bound 
 
1
1
1 1
p
p
p p
         C  (29) 
When p =1 and 4,   C =0.25 and 0.535 respectively. In fact, as 0p  , i.e., without 
traffic congestion in the network,   0 C ; and as p  , i.e., with serve congestion 
in the network,   1 C . Hence, the bound is positively proportional to the degree of 
traffic congestion in the network. This says, in a highly congested (not caused by the 
traffic demand but the parameters of link cost functions) network, there exists more space 
for system improvement when driving the SUE state to a SO state. 
Eq. (28) shows that, when  sue v  approaches 1, the bound decreases. Hence, the 
more the free-flow times of all links approach the link travel times generated in SUE state, 
the more the bound declines (i.e., existing less space for system improvement when 
driving the SUE to a SO). 
Eq. (28) also shows that the bound decreases with the average travel time of all 
network users at SO. Let the average free-flow times for all users be 0c , clearly 0c c  . 
Then, we can relax Eq. (28) by replacing c  with 0c . In this sense, the bound increases 
with the total traffic demand. 
Recall that   1 1w wk g R e  ,  w w w
w W
d D k 

  ,  (1 )w w w
w W
d D k 

  . 
Hence, both   and   are dimensionless coefficients that increase with the number of 
feasible paths, and thus reflect the degree of network complexity. If there is only one path 
available for each OD pair in the network, i.e., 1wR  , w W , then 0wk  , w W  and 
thus 0   . In this case, we have       1sue suemixed 1 1      v C . As demonstrated 
in Guo and Huang (2005), whenever 1wR  , the value of wk  (and hence   and  ) is 
very limited. For sufficiently complex network with the number of paths between each OD 
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pair, 100 1000wR  , wk  takes only a limited value between 2.63 and 4.2. This 
observation shows that the network topology, or the network size and complexity, has very 
limited effects on the cost efficiency bound of the SUE, as claimed by Yang and Huang 
(2005). Even though the effect is small, Eq. (28) shows that the bound would increase 
when the degree of network complexity goes up. 
Obviously, if 0w   or 1, the cost inefficiency bound derived in this study is the 
same with that given by Yang and Huang (2005) in which only one user class is 
considered. If all drivers are not equipped with ATIS, i.e., 0w  , w W , then 0   
and thus  suemixed
1 1(all unequipped) 1
1 c
  
           C
 where  w w
w W
d D k

  ; if all 
drivers are equipped with ATIS, i.e., 1w  , w W , then 0   and thus 
 suemixed
1 1(all equipped) 1
1 c
  
           C
 where  w w
w W
d D k

  . As   , thus 
the bound reached in a ATIS fully adopted network is less than that in a without-ATIS 
network. Furthermore, we rewrite Eq. (27) as 
 
sue
sue mixed
mixed so
1 1 1 1 11
1
w w w
w w
w W w W
T d dk k
T c D D
     
                             C  (30) 
This shows that, with given   and  , the bound decreases with the ATIS market 
penetration w  since   . 
We now check the effect of ATIS quality on the bound. We know that the logit model 
parameter   is inversely proportional to the standard error of the perceived travel time of 
equipped drivers, so, the larger the  -value, the higher the information quality provided 
by ATIS. Let the  -value of unequipped drivers be fixed, Eq. (27) shows that the bound 
decreases with the  -value. This says, the bound would decrease when the ATIS quality 
is improved. As   , we have  
sue
sue mixed
mixed so
1 11
1
T
T c
  
            C
 where 
 (1 )w w w
w W
d D k 

  . We hereby get the price of anarchy of the mixed UE and SUE 
problem with the proportion of number of UE users over all, w  between OD pair 
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w W . Furthermore, as    too, we have  suemixed
1
1
   C  which is the result of 
the price of anarchy of the standard UE problem, independent of the market penetration 
level. 
If all drivers are homogeneous, i.e., the ATIS doesn’t differentiate drivers at all,   , 
we then have  suemixed
1 11
1 c
  
           C
 where  w w
w W
d D k

  . This is the result 
of the standard SUE problem, identical to Yang and Huang (2005), independent of the 
market penetration level.  
Finally, we use a table to summarize the effects of all parameters on the cost 
inefficiency bound, see Table 1. 
Table 1 Effects of various parameters on the cost inefficiency bound 
 Congestion 
degree 
Total 
demand 
Network 
complexity 
ATIS market 
penetration 
Information 
quality 
Bound + + +   
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
We have derived the cost inefficiency bound of a stochastic user equilibrium where all 
users are divided into two classes, one equipped with ATIS and another unequipped. Users 
of both classes follow the SUE principle in route choices, the equipped being able to 
receive real-time traffic information for helping route choice and thus having less degree 
of travel time variability than unequipped. We have further investigated the effects of 
various parameters which reflect the network’s complexity, the link cost function’s 
property, the ATIS quality and market penetration, on the bound of the cost inefficiency of 
the two-user class SUE flow pattern in relation to the Wardropian system optimum. The 
results are summarized in Table 1. 
Some issues that we are further investigating are: (a) to extend the analysis to the case 
with elastic demand; (b) to study the two-user class SUE model with link capacity 
constraints; and (c) to seek more accurate bound for some specific classes of link cost 
functions. 
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